This paper analyzes cognitive e¤ort in 6 di¤erent one-shot p-beauty games. We use both Raven and Cognitive Re ‡ection tests to identify subjects'abilities. We …nd that the Raven test does not provide any insight on beauty contest game playing but CRT does: subjects with higher scores on this test are more prone to play dominant strategies.
Introduction
Recent papers connect individuals' cognitive abilities with performance in di¤erent games through di¤erent tests (see for instance Burnham et al., 2009; Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009 ; Brañas-Garza, Espinosa and Rey-Biel, 2011). This paper expands on this literature using both the Raven and the Cognitive Re ‡ection Test (CRT hereafter) to study how people play a series of six p beauty contest games. We …nd that the Raven test lacks explanatory power, but the CRT makes a di¤erence.
An increasing amount of literature analyzes the connection between economic behavior and cognitive abilities. Frederick (2005) shows that subjects who score high on the CRT are more patient and more willing to take risks in Special thanks to SEJ2007-62081/ECON gains. Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) show similar results for Chilean high school students and, with a more heterogeneous sample, Dohmen et al. (2010) also …nd that cognitive abilities are related to time and risk preferences. Interestingly, Brañas-Garza, Guillen and López (2008) …nd that risk attitudes are similar across subjects with di¤erent computational abilities. Oechssler et al. (2009) show that subjects with low scores on a cognitive test are more likely subjected to the conjunction fallacy and to conservatism to update probabilities. Analyzing the entries in a Travelers' dilemma game, Brañas-Garza, Guillen and Lopez (2011) …nd that subjects who score better on a GRE-type math test tend to "undercut" the rival.
Assuming rationality and common knowledge of rationality, the beauty contest game (BCG hereafter) has a unique Nash equilibrium, i.e., play zero. However, this equilibrium has not been observed in the laboratory setting for the one-shot game, although players tend to the equilibrium after several repetitions with feedback. Alternatively, the literature has considered equilibrium strategies according to depths of levels of reasoning (cognitive hierarchy of thinking) that better describe behavior in this game (Nagel, 1995; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) . A higher level of reasoning indicates higher strategic behavior by subjects and the belief that rivals are also more strategic. Burnham et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between cognitive abilities and choices in a Beauty Contest Game (BCG). They found that individuals with higher scores on the cognitive test choose numbers closer to the Nash equilibrium in the one-shot BCG. They point out that this result could be driven by the fact that subjects with lower scores have more mathematical di¢ culties …nding the equilibrium as they choose dominated numbers 1 . But they also argue that this result could be related to di¤erences in predicting other participants'choices (out of the equilibrium). Coricelli and Nagel (2009) show individuals'brain activity is di¤erent when playing a BCG with another human participant than when playing with a computer that selects the numbers randomly. Furthermore, they …nd that subjects with a higher level of reasoning expect other participants to play strategically, while lowlevel reasoning subjects choose in the belief that others will play randomly (see Coricelli and Nagel, 2009 (Raven, Raven and Court, 2000) measures visual reasoning and analytic intelligence, the capacity to learn from immediate experience with the problem without rely ing on previous knowledge, and mathematical reasoning (Mills, Ablard and Brody, 1993; Ablard and Mills, 1996) . The second test is the CRT proposed by Frederick (2005) ; a short test with only three brief questions that can be answered in less than 3 minutes. The three items of the CRT are designed such that the intuitive response is incorrect, but can be correctly reconsidered through some deliberation. In this sense, the CRT measures cognitive re ‡ectiveness or impulsiveness, respondents' automatic response versus more elaborate and deliberative thought, and is also a good indicator of mathematical skills.
Experimental methods
A total of 191 subjects (74 males and 117 females) participated in the experiment. The experiment was run over 8 sessions; 7 sessions with 24 participants each and one session with 23 participants. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the "old" experimental laboratory of the University of Granada, Spain. The subjects came to the lab and played six rounds of the BCG, one round of the Raven test and one round of the CRT in that order. Subjects were not allowed to use pencils or paper to make calculations. Additionally, they completed some questionnaires and performed some risk lotteries (not reported here).
Beauty Contest Game
The Beauty Contest game 4 consisted of guessing an integer number between 0 and 100 (both limits included) in which the winner is the person whose number is closest to M *(average of all chosen numbers). In contrast to Burnham et al. (2009) , we ran six di¤erent one-shot BCG where M -the known multiplier parameter -takes 6 values: 1=8; 1=5; 1=3; 1=2; 2=3 and 3=4:
The subjects were distributed into groups of 24 individuals. The winner of each round received 20 euros. In the event of a tie, the 20 euros were split between those who tied. We did not provide any feedback between trials. Information about the results of the game was provided at the payment stage (see below). All the subjects played the di¤erent versions of the game in the same order:
Observe that we chose this particular ordering of values of M in such a way that: i) Participants would …nd it more di¢ cult to learn as the values increase and decrease from one game to the next.
ii) Furthermore, this design allows us to distinguish between players who play random numbers and those thinking about their best strategy 5 .
Raven & CRT tests
Originally developed by Dr. John C. Raven in 1936, Raven' s Progressive Matrices are multiple choice tests of abstract reasoning. In each test item, a subject is asked to identify the missing item required to complete a larger pattern (see Figure 1 ). In our case, subjects face 60 matrices, that is, they make 60 choices. We calculate Raven i as the sum of correct answers, hence Raven i 2 [0; 60] where 60 indicates that the subject correctly …lled the 60 matrices. The …nal score is a measure of ability for abstract analytic reasoning and ‡uid intelligence, that is, an ability that does not rely on knowledge or skill acquired from experience as opposed to crystallized intelligence (see Horn and Catell, 1966 6 relation between high scores on the test and entries in the BCG. Once the subjects …nished the Raven test, they completed the CRT developed by Frederick (2005) . The CRT consists of three short questions:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 7 6 Note that there is a unique Nash equilibrium (for any of the 6 BCGs de…ned in this paper) where all players play zero. 7 Due to an unintended typographical error, the second question of the CRT was shown to the participants as follows: If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 1 widget, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?. In this case, the intuitive response is not 100, as in the original version. Since we analyze players' behavior according to the number of correct answers, and not their impulsiveness, this has not a signi…cant impact in our results. Note that the correct answer now, 25 minutes, is a little bit more di¢ cult to calculate. We have replicated the analysis using only questions one and three in the CRT, and we don't …nd substantial di¤erences in the results. 3 . In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
The three questions have an obvious incorrect answer (10, 100, and 24), that can be easily corrected upon minimal re ‡ection. Those who arrive at the correct answers are less impulsive and more likely to engage in re ‡ective thinking 8 . In this sense, the CRT can be viewed as a combination of cognitive capacity and the disposition for judgement and decision making (Finucane and Guillon, 2010; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011). Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) put forward that the CRT captures important characteristics of rational thinking that are not measured on other intelligence tests. They argue that humans tend to use the simplest cognitive mechanism, which could mean that sometime behave not fully rational. The CRT is computed as the number of questions answered correctly. Frederick (2005) shows that the scores are highly correlated with some other tests of analytic thinking (such as the ACT, NFC, SAT and WPT). We predicted that subjects that do better on this test are more likely to choose lower entries in the BCG.
Its important to mention here that the subjects completed the CRT as the last task. Moreover, they did the test in front of a computer and without pencils or paper to make their calculations. This may explain why the results are, on average, not so good (128 individuals, 67% of the sample pool, did not provide any right answers) compared to those shown in Frederick (2005) 9 . Since we were interested in detecting speci…c subjects who are able to solve these questions -without any help-this particular set-up posed no problems for us. In this sense, our sample of subjects is a lower bound. Moreover, our BCG is also computerized, hence this appears to be the most "sensible" comparison. As expected, scoring on the Raven test and the CRT are correlated (Spearman's rho = 0:29; p value < 0:000). 8 For example, the third question is particularly interesting in our case as it requires some recursive thinking to be solved. This could be the case for the BCG and the way to think about it in a step-by-step reasoning procedure (see Coricelli and Nagel, 2009 for an extensive discussion) 9 Only 23% (44 out of 191) and 9% (17 out of 191) of the subjects scored 1 and 2 on the CRT, respectively. None of the subjects responded correctly to the three questions. Frederick (2005) reports that 33%, 28%, 23%, and 17% of the participants scored 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Results
First, we explore the e¤ect of individual cognitive abilities through the BCG. As in previous studies, just a few subjects played according to the Nash equilibrium. For all six games, the choices range from 0 to 100 10 . Figure  2 shows the mean values of the subjects' choices, which were classi…ed for their score on the CRT (CRT=0 vs. CRT>0). It is easy to see that subjects' choices are related to their performance on the CRT. Table 1 shows a series of six Tobit models where the dependent variable is, in each case, the individual guess, g i 2 [0; 100]. As independent variables we used f emale, Raven i and CRT i . The models are presented in the same order in which they were played. There are two salient results: i) Raven is never signi…cant, and ii) CRT appears to be signi…cant after two trials. After minimal experience, subjects with a positive score on the CRT behave better 11 . We study also how subjects play across games. First, we analyze the number of players who played dominated strategies and the relation to the cognitive tests. We observe that the proportion of players that never played a dominated strategy di¤ers according to their CRT score: 27:34% of players with CRT = 0 versus 35:94% with CRT>0, although this di¤erence is not signi…cant (p value = 0:11, proportion unilateral test).
We compute the variable irrat (2 [0; 6]) as the number of times the subject played dominated strategies, i.e., if "guess > M 100"
12 . We must emphasize that it is not the same to fail in the …rst game (M = 2=3) than in the last one (M = 1=2) as the last choice is assumed to be easier. In the last guess, subjects have already learned through the pure experience of the game (feedback free learning; Weber, 2003) . The variable exp_irrational captures this idea. We de…ne exp_irrational (2 [0; 63]) as the number of times the subject plays dominated strategies weighted by the order they were played 13 . Table 2 below shows the results of estimating the e¤ect of both Raven and CRT on rationality. We use censored Tobit regression with normal disturbances models according to the values of the dependent variable. 12 Note that the use of > instead of is NOT trivial. This is because when subjects guess the = M*100, they are not best-responding. In any case, there are very few subjects in this extreme case. 13 exp _irrat=2 Once again we …nd that Raven does not have any explanatory power. However, CRT appears to be signi…cant again: subjects with positive scores on the CRT are less prone to play dominated strategies. This is true for both de…nitions of learning.
Concluding remarks
The BCG is an intriguing game in that only a tiny fraction of people are able to solve it, but once the logic of the game is revealed, most people …nd the Nash equilibrium to be an obvious prediction. This paper explores if people who are able to solve the BCG have higher cognitive abilities. We measure intelligence using two complementary tests: the Raven and the CRT. Our subject pool played six (incentivized) one-shot p-beauty games without any feedback. We …nd that subjects with higher scores on the CRT test are more prone to play according to the Nash equilibrium. In sharp contrast, the Raven test does not provide any insight on BCG playing. 
Economic Science Institute Working Papers

11-06
Rietz, T., Schniter, E., Sheremeta, R., and Shields, T. Trust, Reciprocity and Rules.
11-05
Corgnet, B., Hernan-Gonzalez, R., and Rassenti, S. Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations. 
11-04
